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Abstract
The current study examines the effect of audit quality and 
internal and external corporate governance on the quality of 
disclosure of financial statements. In order to achieving the 
objectives of the study 7 hypotheses about audit quality and 
7 hypotheses about internal and external corporate govern-
ance are postulated in the current study during 2009-2014 in 
Iran. Data analyzed in two regression models via the R soft-
ware. The results indicate that there is no significant positive 
relationship between independent audit quality and the quality 
of disclosure of financial statements information, but there is 
a significant relationship between corporate governance and 
the quality of disclosure of financial statements information. 
So far, the current study is the first paper on the subject which 
conducted in the developing country such like Iran, the results 
of the study may give the strength to the auditing literature.
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1 Introduction
Companies as economic enterprises are always looking for 
more profitability and greater wealth. For various reasons, 
most notably the separation of ownership from management, in 
addition to carrying out economic activities the companies are 
responsible to respond to people outside the company, as well. 
The reliability of figures and numbers that form the most impor-
tant part of financial reporting has been seriously questioned 
because of bankruptcy of famous companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom, so that the investors do not trust the financial state-
ments prepared by the management. Such bankruptcies raise 
questions about the role of corporate governance and other 
reassuring factors in the transparency and completeness of the 
financial reporting. Providing unreal and inadequate financial 
reporting such as confirmation of various accounting abuse in 
companies caused the market reaction towards the improve-
ment of corporate governance in companies. In monitoring the 
management, stakeholders can rely on different mechanisms of 
corporate management such as independent board of directors 
and independent auditors. Corporate governance factors are 
important for the auditor in the audit process to confirm the 
financial reporting (Desender et al., 2011). Empirical evidence 
shows that poor corporate governance often decreases the qual-
ity of financial reporting, and causes changes in and overstat-
ing the profits and fraud in financial statements (Carcello et 
al., 2002). Therefore, the companies have always been look-
ing for ways to improve their financial reporting via methods 
such as corporate governance. One of the ways to achieve such 
goals is to disclose adequate information for economic decision 
makers. Thus, our main concern in this study is to measure the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms and independent 
audit on the financial information disclosure which has a signif-
icant effect on the users’ reliance on the financial reports. The 
increasing importance of corporate governance and internal 
control of financial reporting is significantly resulting from the 
increase of managers’ responsibility to handle corporate gov-
ernance in the audit process. The auditors practice audit activi-
ties particularly the audit committee which is constantly dealing 
with complicated methods of corporate governance. Therefore, 
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the auditors must generally ensure the shareholders to receive 
high quality financial reporting and to protect their rights 
(Desender et al., 2011). Shareholders’ right is the first princi-
ple of the OCED (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) principles and is considered as a basis for 
the principles of corporate governance. The rights and inter-
ests of potential investors and shareholders are supplied when 
the information reported by the company is sufficient and can 
direct the decision makers towards the right and logical deci-
sions. Therefore, the information disclosure is highly impor-
tant for the economic decision makers. They always need very 
reliable information in order to make reasonable and logical 
decisions. Providing such information is exclusive to economic 
companies and enterprises and the users just rely on the infor-
mation published. Consequently, the governments have always 
made obligations for the further disclosure of information by 
the companies for the users.  According to the agency theory, 
the managers as the representatives of the shareholders may 
behave in such a way or make decisions that are not necessar-
ily towards maximizing the shareholders’ wealth. According to 
this theory, adequate control mechanisms should be provided 
to protect the shareholders against the conflict of interests. The 
transparency of financial statements and the quality of infor-
mation disclosure are considered as the practical solutions. 
Therefore, the transparency and the high quality of information 
will cause information asymmetry.
As a result, poor financial disclosure misleads the sharehold-
ers and has an adverse effect on their wealth. Wallace states 
that many issues influence the information disclosure such as 
the competitiveness of the market for the information disclo-
sure, the company’s interest to disclose information in order to 
attract more capital, the internal structure of the company and 
the inability to do fraudulent reporting (corporate governance), 
review of the financial reports of the company by experts (inde-
pendent audit), etc. (Wallace, 1994). Therefore, the independ-
ent audit is considered as a control factor for the information 
disclosure by the management and the company. This research 
tries to investigate whether or not corporate governance mech-
anisms and independent audit can affect the information disclo-
sure by the companies and improve the information disclosure 
of the companies for better decision making for the users of 
such information.
1.1 Financial reporting in Iran
Financial reporting in Iran is based on 34 accounting stand-
ards. These standards prepare by Auditing organization. Iranian 
Accounting Standards (IAS) is based on reliable and relevance 
to financial statements users. The companies that listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and those that want to come into 
TEM must observe the IAS. Accounting standards in Iran con-
sider some imitations to financial information presentation for 
user’s protection. Therefore, IAS enhances financial information 
transparency and gave this assurance to users that the financial 
statements have efficient reliable, relevance and transparency.
1.2 Iranian audit Standards
Auditing in general definition is conformity of measur-
able claim to determined criterion by independent auditor 
and reports the results. According to this definition, financial 
statement auditing is investigate the conformity of financial 
statement to accounting standards by independent auditor and 
presents the auditing report. The auditing standards in this rela-
tionship is regulatory that compile with professional associa-
tions (in Iran by Iran’s CPA) and communicate to other audit-
ing firm. These auditing standards undertake validation and 
insurance of financial statement duty. Therefore, the auditing 
standards pay attention to financial statement users and try to 
financial information with more transparency.
2 Theoretical issues
Economic decision makers always need very reliable infor-
mation in order to make reasonable and logical decisions. 
Providing such information is exclusive to economic compa-
nies and enterprises and the information users just rely on the 
information published. Therefore, the companies are always 
obliged to publish information related to decision making for 
the users and decision makers. Thus, the governments have 
always made obligations for the further disclosure of infor-
mation by the companies for the users. Wallace (1994) states 
that that many factors affect the information disclosure such as 
the competitiveness of the market for the information disclo-
sure, the company’s interest to disclose information in order 
to attract more capital, the internal structure of the company 
and the inability to do fraudulent reporting (corporate govern-
ance), review of the financial reports of the company by experts 
(independent audit), etc. This research investigates the effect 
of audit quality and internal and external corporate governance 
on the quality of disclosure of financial statements. Financial 
reporting and adequate information disclosure have a signifi-
cant role in the decisions made by the users of the companies’ 
information. These variables are reviewed in the following.
2.1 Corporate Governance
One of the qualitative characteristics of financial informa-
tion is its reliability. Reliable information is free from impor-
tant biased tendencies and honestly introduces what it claims 
to be or is expected to express it reasonably. With regard to the 
issue of separation of ownership from management, corporate 
governance system and the related theories such as agency the-
ory, stakeholders’ theory, and other relevant theories, it seems 
quite necessary to examine and audit the financial statements 
of the companies. 
Corporate governance is a fundamental element in boosting 
the investors’ confidence, promoting the sense of competition, 
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and finally improving the economic growth. This element tops 
the list of international development. James Wolfensohn the for-
mer president of the World Bank says in this regard:” Corporate 
governance for the growth of global economy is more impor-
tant than the nations’ sovereignty” (Anderson, 2003).
Corporate governance system identifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders of the 
companies such as the managers, employees, shareholders, 
and other legal entities and citizens that have been influenced 
by and have influenced the company’s activities. This system 
that determines the rules and procedures for decision making 
process including goal setting, determining means to achieve 
objectives, and designing control systems is closely associ-
ated with the methods that the suppliers of financial sources 
(shareholders) apply to ensure the return of their capital (Piot, 
2007). The review of literature shows that there is no agreed-
upon definition of corporate governance. The principles of 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
cover 6 key principles of corporate governance area includ-
ing insuring the creation of necessary conditions for the effec-
tive framework of corporate governance, shareholders rights, 
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure, 
transparency and the responsibilities of the board of directors. 
One of the important aspects of corporate governance which is 
emphasized in the above principles is the information transpar-
ency. Transparent information due to reduction of information 
asymmetry can lead to the assumed fair distribution.
2.2 Agency Theory
An important assumption of agency theory is that it is dif-
ficult and complicated for the audit client to confirm the agent 
work. Independent audit is one of the most important and yet 
one of the most effective ways to align the interests of manag-
ers and shareholders. On the other hand, good publicity and 
reputation of audit entity have great effects on the validity and 
reliability of accounting data and information. In theoretical 
foundations, the size of audit entity has a direct effect on its 
reputation and credibility (Beatty, 1989). Agency theory rep-
resents a conflict between the owners and the managers, the 
conflict which partly reduces through the financial reporting. 
Regular financial reporting is a tool through which the own-
ers can monitor the employment contracts. Accountants call 
this type of routine report stewardship (or accountability to 
the company owners). This theory has been used to explain the 
need to audit. Auditor in fact acts as an independent inspec-
tor auditing the financial reports provided by the managers to 
the owners. Historical development of financial reporting and 
auditor both support the agency theory arguments (Wallace, 
1994). Therefore, the main investors of the company and also 
the institutional and potential investors like to have access to 
the information that can help them in their decisions. Such 
information should be prepared through the established rules 
and standards and the independent audit behaves as the expert 
confirming and approving of the use of information in this way. 
The accounting association committee on basic auditing (1973) 
has referred to the role of auditing in creating value for the 
information and believes that the users of the audit reports are 
the main beneficiaries of the added value. Consequently, audit-
ing has a significant effect on financial statements. 
Full disclosure requires that financial statements be designed 
and prepared in such a way that they can reflect an accurate 
image of economic events that have affected the economic 
entity within a period and involve the information that can be 
helpful for a common investment and won’t mislead the reader. 
More obviously, full disclosure means that any important infor-
mation that an ordinary investor is interested in should not be 
deleted or hidden (Riahi Balkooei, 2000). It is the independ-
ent auditor’s duty to discover such eliminated issues or the 
intentional or unintentional errors. Thus, the auditor obligates 
the adequate disclosure of the information by the companies 
through the service that provides for the information users. As 
a result, one of the main assumptions of this study is to investi-
gate the possibility of increasing the information disclosure by 
the companies through the independent auditing.
2.3 Audit Quality 
2.3.1 Definitions Related to Audit Quality
Various definitions have been made for the audit quality. In 
professional literature, the audit quality is defined in relation 
to observing the audit standards. On the contrary, accounting 
researchers consider multiple dimensions for the audit qual-
ity which often lead to apparently different definitions. The 
most common definitions of audit quality involve the follow-
ing elements:
• The possibility of significant errors in the financial state-
ments that the auditor is able to decipher. 
• The possibility that the auditor might not issue condi-
tional report for the financial statements containing im-
portant errors. 
• An assessment of the auditor’s ability to reduce the bi-
ased errors and misstatements and to improve the quality 
of accounting data
• The accuracy of the information about which the auditor 
has made reports
• The aforementioned definitions cover different levels of 
the auditors’ competence and independence in the audit 
(true independence) and also the perception of their inde-
pendence by the users.
One of the most common definitions of the audit quality 
is the one offered by De Angelo (1981). She defines the audit 
quality as the market assessment of the probability that (1) the 
auditor might discover the material misstatement in financial 
statements and or the accounting system of the audit client, and 
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(2) that he will report the discovered material misstatement. De 
Angelo’s definition shows a critical feature of the perception of 
the effect of auditing on the information of financial statements. 
The statement of the audit fundamental concepts studies the 
auditor’s ability to control the quality of the generated data and 
to ensure to compare them with generally accepted accounting 
principles. According to the first part of De Angelo’s definition 
this depends on the auditor’s competence to discover the men-
tioned misstatement which is subject to the auditor’s independ-
ence. After De Angelo, the definitions related to audit quality 
got more completed gradually. For instance, one year after De 
Angelo, Dopuch and Simunic (1980) argue that the audit qual-
ity is a function of the number performed audit procedures and 
auditors and large audit entities have obviously more resources 
to conduct audit tests. Titman and Truman (1986) have defined 
the audit quality as the accuracy of information that is pro-
vided for the investors after auditing. Palmrose (1988) defines 
the audit quality in terms of the auditor accreditation. Since 
the auditor aims to make the financial statements reliable, the 
audit quality means the audited financial statements’ being free 
from material misstatement. This definition emphasizes the 
audit results. After such definitions, Davidson and Neu (1993) 
associate the audit quality with the financial statements and 
believe that the audit quality is the auditor’s ability to discover 
and eliminate material misstatement and to discover manual 
changes made in the net profit.
2.4 Audit Quality in the current study
The factors affecting audit quality in this study include audi-
tor industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit institute age, 
audit institute quality, and audit fees.
2.5 Disclosure and Information Disclosure Quality
Disclosure is the general distribution of information vol-
untarily by following the legal regulations and administrative 
provisions although the information can customarily be kept 
confidential (Medeiros and Quinteiro, 2005). 
Verrecchia (1982) attempted to present a classification of 
accounting literature about disclosure. In other words, he has 
tried to present the classification of different models of disclo-
sure in accounting literature in the form of integrated titles. 
In terms of classification, he proposes three main groups of 
research on disclosure in accounting. The first group which 
is called association-based disclosure includes activities in 
which the effect of external disclosure on the investors’ per-
sonal activities due to cumulative effect or disorder is studied. 
The effect appears at first through the behavior of equilibrium 
prices and the size of transactions. The second group which 
is called discretionary-based disclosure includes activities in 
which discretion exercise by the managers or companies in 
relation to the disclosure of information about what they might 
be aware of is investigated. The third group which is referred 
to as the efficiency-based disclosure includes activities in 
which disclosure strategies without earlier awareness of the 
information are preferred, or in other words are preferred con-
ditionally. According to his advice the reduction of informa-
tion asymmetry can be a means for integrating the efficiency 
of disclosure selection, disclosure stimulation incentives, and 
endogenous process of capital market as encompassing the 
interactions between various individuals and investors.
Even though the terms of accounting information quality 
and transparency of accounting standards or disclosure system 
are used jointly and alternatively, it is very difficult to provide 
a clear and accurate definition of quality or transparency which 
is acceptable to everyone. Pownall and Schipper (1991) defined 
transparency as “the standards that reveal the events, occur-
rences, judgments, and estimates as financial statements and 
their applications”. According to Arthur Levitt, the former chair-
man of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the optimal accounting standards are the ones the financial 
statements prepared according to which report the events dur-
ing the periods they have occurred not in earlier or later periods. 
Moreover, according to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) the dis-
closure quality is the accuracy of the beliefs of the investors who 
are suspicious about the exchange value after receiving disclosed 
information. In relation to the agency theory and the separation 
of ownership from management King (1996) states that in the 
absence of anti-fraud provisions the disclosure quality can be 
defined as a degree of bias based on the personal benefit seek-
ing of the managers. Ball et al. (2000) interpreted transparency 
as a combination of the characteristics of punctuality and con-
servatism. Punctuality refers to the extent to which the economic 
events of the current time are recorded in the financial statements 
of the current period and conservatism means reflecting bad eco-
nomic news more quickly than good news in financial reporting. 
The recent definition also covers management asymmetric incen-
tives such as unreliability of the reported good news and the reli-
ability of the reported bad news. Hopkins has defined disclosure 
quality as the feasibility of studying and interpreting financial 
statements by the investors. Ball et al. (2000) associate disclo-
sure quality with the information features, Brown and Hillegiest 
(2007) believe that disclosure quality shows the general warning 
of the company disclosure and depends on the size of disclosed 
information, timeliness of information and its accuracy. Thus, 
the high quality of disclosure and information symmetry causes 
further coordination between managers and investors in relation 
to the investment decisions. However, information asymmetry 
due to low quality of disclosure will be followed by incorrect 
selection (De Angelo, 1981).
Finally, we define disclosure quality in this research as:
The degree of reliability of the information disclosure qual-
ity, relevance and correctness of the information that increased 
by independent audit.
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3 Literature review
Studies in the field of audit quality began with De Angelo’s 
research in 1981. In her research, he divided the audit quality 
into two parts of detecting the fault of audit client, audit sys-
tem and reporting. A few years later, Libby and Fredrick (1990) 
investigated the audit quality from the perspective of auditors. 
They concluded that from the auditors’ points of view the audi-
tor abilities and economic incentives would affect the audit 
quality. They also claimed that professional and experienced 
auditors would have better understanding of errors made in pre-
paring the financial statements which can improve the quality 
of audit decisions. Three years later Davidson and Neu (1993) 
defined the audit quality as the auditor’s ability to discover and 
report material misstatement and to discover manual changes 
made in the net profit. The research literature is reviewed in 
the following by referring to independent variables separately.
We defined the audit quality in this research as:
Reviews with more precision, more complete and based on 
audit standards that reduce the manipulation of financial state-
ments by management and ultimately improves the quality of 
information disclosure.
3.1 Audit Firms Size
Research shows that large audit firms offer better auditing 
than small audit firms and also appear to be more effective 
in post-audit services. In another research Davidson and Neu 
(1993) shown that large audit firms have greater clients; there-
fore, the market expectation to detect the misstatements in finan-
cial statements by the auditors will increase. In addition, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that larger audit firms have superior audit 
quality because they are benefiting from better resources and 
facilities for training auditors to conduct audits compared with 
smaller firms. Krishnan and Schauer (2000) evaluated the rela-
tionship between the firm size and audit quality and concluded 
that the large audit firms have better service quality than small 
audit firms. Thus the first hypothesis of the research is:
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between the 
audit firm size and the quality of disclosure.
3.2 Auditor Industry Specialization
Economic theories indicate that the audit profession has 
got mature and progressed by finding new ways to distinguish 
between special services in audit institutions. One of the tools 
in this regard is industry specialization.       
Hogan and Jeter (1999) found that audit firms with brands 
do some efforts to increase the level of their expertise. They 
try to concentrate on industry regulations and characteristics 
which have relatively low risk of lawsuit, rapid growth, and 
relatively great audit clients. 
Those audit firms that have many audit clients in an industry 
can understand the specific risks associated with that industry 
better. After Davidson’s research, Myers et al. (2003) stated 
that one of the quantitative indices of measuring the audit qual-
ity is the auditor care and his monitoring ability, i.e. the auditor 
tenure. They concluded that the more the auditor tenure is, the 
more his knowledge of the client and his expertise in industry 
will be which leads to the increase of audit quality. By observ-
ing the relative market share of audit firms which provide ser-
vice for a specific industry it is possible to realize the audit 
firm industry expertise. The firm that has a larger share of the 
market has higher specialized knowledge about the industry. 
The results of the research conducted by Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) and Falatah (2006) indicate that high level of auditor 
tenure increases his knowledge and expertise in the relevant 
industry and improves the audit quality. In another research 
entitled “The effect of auditor tenure and industry specializa-
tion on earnings quality, Ferdinand et al. (2009) concluded that 
whenever the auditor industry specialization is low the rela-
tionship between the longer auditor tenure and higher quality 
of earnings is stronger and vice versa. DeBoskey et al. (2012) 
investigated the auditor industry specialization and earnings 
management. In their research they have emphasized the audi-
tor industry specialization as one of the factors affecting the 
quality of auditing. They state that industry specialist auditors 
are like a barrier to the earnings management. They have con-
cluded that the use of industry specialist auditors will reduce 
the earnings management. Abidin et al. (2012) have investi-
gated the relationship between the auditor industry specializa-
tion and the reporting time. They referred to the auditor indus-
try specialization as a variable affecting the audit quality and 
concluded that selecting industry specialist auditors will lead 
to reduction of the reporting time and timely information. Sun 
and Liu (2011) investigated the auditor industry specialization 
by analyzing the financial information. They referred to auditor 
industry specialization as a variable affecting the audit quality. 
They concluded that industry specialist auditors are more capa-
ble of analyzing the firm activities and processes and financial 
and qualitative reports. Habib et al. (2011) studied the effect of 
auditor industry specialization on the delay of audit reporting. 
They concluded that industry specialist auditors would prepare 
the audit reports on time. Therefore, the second hypothesis of 
the research is expressed as the following:
H
2
: There is a significant positive relationship between 
independent auditor industry specialization and the quality of 
disclosure.
3.3 Auditor Tenure (Auditor Selection Continuity)
Independency is the foundation and the soul of auditing 
and auditing without independency has no value. People and 
investment market trust in auditors is because of their inde-
pendency. Therefore, the factors threatening independence 
should always be examined. In this regard, one of the areas 
which have always been discussed in recent decades is the 
audit tenure (Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Studies show that 
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having job experience and a specific audit client will increase 
the audit quality. It is also more likely to obtain better informa-
tion about the quality of work and business processes of the 
audit client (Carcello et al., 2002). Myers et al. (2003) con-
cluded that high periods of auditing tenure will increase the 
auditor’s knowledge and expertise in relation to the relevant 
audit client industry. With emphasis on the increase of expert 
auditors’ knowledge about the relevant industry the results of 
the research conducted by Carcello and Nagy (2002) indicate 
that high auditor tenure will increase the level of audit quality. 
In a research entitled “The effect of auditor tenure and auditor 
industry specialization on the earnings quality”, Ferdinand et 
al. (2009) concluded that when the auditor industry specializa-
tion is low the relationship between longer auditor tenure and 
higher earnings quality is stronger and vice versa. In their new 
research, Gonzalez et al. (2015) investigated the auditor tenure 
and audit quality and concluded that there is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. 
In another research, taking into account the auditor’s opinions, 
Blandon et al. (2013) noted the effect of auditor tenure on his 
comment on the audit work and concluded that the auditor ten-
ure would enhance the audit quality but would undermine the 
auditor independence. While most of the researches emphasize 
the enhancement of audit quality due to the increase of audi-
tor tenure Sajadi et al. (2012) argue that the auditor selection 
continuity will reduce the independence and quality of audit-
ing for three reasons: first, the nature of auditing is such that 
it creates an ongoing relationship between the auditor and the 
management of the examined entity. Long-term relationship 
between the auditor and the audit client might lead to excessive 
intimacy and very close relationship between the auditor and 
the audit client management that finally will make the auditor 
ignore the detected misstatements during the auditing. Second, 
auditor selection continuity will make auditing monotonous for 
the auditors and this will reduce the auditors’ professional com-
petence. Third, the desire to have long-term income through 
the audit fee might make the auditor consider the audit client 
satisfaction as an important factor in his decisions in order to 
remain at his position. Consequently, given the above back-
ground, the third hypothesis of the research is as the following:
H
3
: There is a significant positive relationship between audi-
tor tenure and the quality of disclosure.
3.4 Auditor Reputation and Quality
Large audit firms have high reputation and usually spend 
more money to train their auditors and have stronger control. 
Dopuch and Simunic (1980) believe that large audit firms invest 
a lot to increase their audit quality. Craswel et al. (2002) con-
cluded in their research that famous audit firms have higher fees 
and care more for their reputation and fame auditing by famous 
audit firms will affect the audit quality and will increase the 
credibility of the audit firm. Auditing Standard Board (2011) 
states that the more famous and qualified is the auditor from the 
public point of view, the higher quality will have the conducted 
auditing. They state that the high quality should be confirmed 
by other professionals too (i.e. the other auditors should also 
accept the auditor as a famous and qualified one). Fargher et al. 
(2012) in their research on the reputation and quality of audi-
tor and demand for audit service have addressed the auditor 
reputation and quality as one of the factors influencing the audit 
quality and have stated that the more qualified is the auditor, 
the demands for his auditing and in general for audit services 
will increase. Pittman and Fortin (2014) investigated the effect 
of auditor reputation and quality on the US companies cost of 
debt. They found a positive relationship between the two varia-
bles because their research was based on the research conducted 
by De Angelo (1981) that states that creditors are sensitive to 
the auditor fame and reputation as a measure of audit quality 
which results from the effect of reputation and quality of audit 
firm on the quality of conducted auditing. Consequently, given 
the above background, the fourth hypothesis of the research is 
posed as follows:
H
4
: There is a significant positive relationship between firms 
rating (reputation and quality) and the quality of disclosure.
3.5 Audit Firm Age and Experience
Libby and Fredrick (1990) found that the more experienced 
the auditors are the greater is their understanding of misstate-
ment in financial statements. Therefore, they have concluded 
that the quality of auditor decision improves as his auditing 
experience increases. So, the more experienced the auditor is 
the better service he will provide for the society. Craswell et 
al. (2002) concluded in their research that experienced auditors 
will conduct high-quality auditing in order to maintain their 
fame and reputation. Roussy (2013) mentioned that the audi-
tors experience in auditing would lead to the increase of audit 
quality and more accurate examination by them. Khajavi and 
Noshadi (2009) investigated the role of auditor experience in 
solving the issues of illegality and irregular audit issues (like 
new issues). They concluded that the more experienced the 
auditor is, the more successful he is in solving auditing issues. 
According to the mentioned studies and with regard to the 
effect of auditors’ age and experience on audit quality, the fifth 
hypothesis of the research is stated as follows:
H
5
: There is a significant positive relationship between the 
mean of the years of experience of audit firm and the quality 
of disclosure.
3.6 Audit Fees
Audit fees reflect the economic costs of efficient auditors. 
Form the auditor point of view auditors are seeking to mini-
mize the total costs through balancing the costs of their own 
resources and expenses of further audit work and the future 
losses due to legal liability. Further auditing efforts will reduce 
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the probability of incurred debt losses for the auditors and the 
auditor offers a volume of auditing that minimizes the total 
costs (Carcello et al., 2002). Consequently, the sixth hypothesis 
of the research is stated as follows:
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between audit 
fees and the quality of disclosure.
3.7 Audit Committee
Teoh and Lim (1996) investigated the effect of several fac-
tors including the audit committee of the audit client on the 
auditor independence. The results show that from the per-
spective of independent auditors and the auditors employed 
in manufacturing firms the audit committee of the audit client 
has an increasing effect on the auditor independence. Thus, 
the audit committee increases the audit quality. Therefore, the 
seventh hypothesis of the research is associated with the audit 
committee.
H
7
: There is a significant positive relationship between the 
auditor tenure and the quality of disclosure.
3.8 Corporate Governance Mechanisms
According to agency theory, the presence of outside man-
agers and their monitoring function as independent individu-
als will reduce the conflict between companies’ managers 
and shareholders (Jensen and MeckLing, 1976). According to 
Leung et al. (2006) the board of directors whose majority of the 
members are independent outside individuals, will have suit-
able control over the opportunistic behaviors of the manage-
ment. In some research especially in developing countries (For 
instance Haniffa and Cook (2002) no significant relationship 
was found.
The size of the board of directors includes the number of 
directors –both bound and outside- that are the members of the 
board. According to agency theory, the greater number of mem-
bers plays a critical role in making strategic decisions by the 
companies. Moreover, as the number of members increases, the 
possibility of management control will increase and also it will 
raise the experience of the board of directors.
CEO duality of responsibility occurs when the CEO is simul-
taneously the chairman and the vice chairman of the board of 
directors. Piot (2007) showed that when a person is in charge of 
both these tasks he will be less willing to disclose appropriate 
information for the users. Some studies such as those conducted 
by Haniffa and Cook (2002) and Lakhal (2005) have shown a 
negative relationship between the two variables. Therefore, the 
hypotheses associated with corporate governance mechanisms 
in this research are as the following:
H
8
: There is a significant positive relationship between bank 
debt and quality of disclosure.
H
9
: There is a significant positive relationship between size 
of the board of directors and quality of disclosure.
H
10
: There is a significant positive relationship between 
CEO membership in the board and quality of disclosure.
H11: There is a significant positive relationship between 
independency of board and quality of disclosure.
H
12
: There is a significant positive relationship between gov-
ernment ownership and influence in company and quality of 
disclosure.
H
13
: There is a significant positive relationship between 
main or subsidiary company and quality of disclosure.
H
14
: There is a significant positive relationship between adop-
tion of corporate governance rules and quality of disclosure.
The following studies can be referred to in relation to the qual-
ity of disclosure. No research was found that had investigated the 
relationship between audit quality and disclosure quality.
The findings of Lang and Landholm (1996) indicate that 
there is a significant relationship between disclosure quality and 
the companies’ earnings. Healy et al. (1999) found that compa-
nies with higher disclosure quality experience some rises in the 
current stock price which is higher than the performance of their 
current income. The findings of the research by Gelb and Zarvin 
(2000) indicate that companies with higher disclosure qual-
ity have higher price than the current and future income com-
pared with the companies with lower disclosure quality. Lang 
and Landholm (1993) concluded that high quality disclosure of 
information in companies would cause more accurate predic-
tion of profit. Botosan (1997) concluded that the increase of 
disclosure quality would reduce the cost of capital. The results 
of the research conducted by Jensen et al. (2006) indicate that 
companies with lower disclosure quality have better future per-
formance than the other companies in their industry. Chi (2009) 
investigated the effect of disclosure quality on the performance 
of Taiwanese companies. The results of the research indicate 
that there is a direct and significant relationship between the 
disclosure quality and companies performance. Bhojraj et al. 
(2003) investigated the agency issues and the role of corporate 
governance. They were seeking to determine different agency 
relations and the role of different mechanisms of corporate 
governance such as the structure of shareholders and board of 
directors and also the responsibility and duty of executive and 
non-executive directors and also the method of disclosing nec-
essary information for stakeholders to make decisions and to 
decrease the problems and the issues of representatives. They 
found that each one of the mentioned mechanisms would have 
its own restrictions. They also found that the mechanisms would 
be effective with each other not alone. Meanwhile, they figured 
out the existence of agency problems in companies despite the 
corporate governance mechanisms. Devalle and Rezzato (2012) 
investigated the voluntary disclosure quality with emphasis on 
assets particularly the goodwill. In order to calculate the good-
will they used the indices or the privileges granted to the compa-
nies. They concluded that disclosure quality index in companies 
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is low for disclosing such assets. Core et al. (2014) investigated 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and insti-
tutional ownership and capital cost. They used the privileges 
granted to the companies in order to measure disclosure quality 
in their research. They concluded that there was a negative rela-
tionship between voluntary disclosure quality and institutional 
ownership and capital cost.
4 Research Method
4.1 Research Population and Sample
The research population includes the companies listed on 
Tehran Stock Exchange for a period of five years since 2009 
to 2014. The following restrictions have been considered for 
selecting the companies:
1. The company should have been listed on stock exchange 
before 2009 and its membership should have continued 
until 2014. 
2. The company should not have trading halt more than 6 
months during the research.
3. The fiscal year of the company should end at the end of 
solar year.
4. Audit fees should have been disclosed since 2009 to 2014.
After applying above restrictions and evaluating all compa-
nies of the population, 146 companies, or in other words, 730 
years companies were selected as the sample.
4.2 Research Variables and Models
4.3 Analytical Model
In this research, panel data and regression model of panel 
data (Joint Effects Model) have been used and the data have 
been analyzed using R software.
As mentioned before, in this research the effect of audit quality 
on the quality of information disclosure of companies is meas-
ured. To do so, the relationship between variables measuring the 
aforementioned criteria is tested based on the following model:
Model 1:
DISCLOSURE= β
0
 + β1SPECIALITYi,t + β2PERIODi,t + β3 
EXPERIMENT i,t  + β4 QUALITY i,t + β5 FEE i,t  + β6 SIZE i,t + 
β
7
 LEVERAGE i,t + β8 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Model 2: 
DISCLOSURE = β
0
 + β1BANKDEBTi,t + β2BOARDSIZEi,t
+ β
3
 DUALITY i,t + β4 INDEPENDENT i,t  + β5 
GOVERNMENT i,t + β6 MAIN i,t + εi
Where: βi is the coefficient of the model variables which re-
duces to zero as the sample size increases.
4.4 Variables Describe
The independent variable in this study is the audit quality 
that measured by auditor industry specialization, auditor ten-
ure, audit fees, audit firm quality, antiquity audit firm variables.
SPECIALITY: Auditor industry specialization indicates 
the auditor’s focus and expertise in the industry and ability 
to detect threats and risks are and related to industry. Auditor 
industry specialization is measured by market share approach. 
In this way, the more auditors’ market share leads to more audi-
tor industry specializing in the industry. We calculate Auditor’s 
market share as follow:
Auditor’s market share = Total assets audit firm in the indus-
try/ Total assets of all employers Auditor firm in the industry
The audit firms are industry specialist that their market 
shares are more than the 1/number of all firms in the industry.
PERIOD: Audit firm tenure, means number of years that the 
audit firm do auditing company.
EXPERIMENT: Antiquity audit firm means number of years 
that the audit firm accepted to Iran’s CPA.
FEE: Audit fees is the payment for audit services performed 
in employer company that extracted general and administrative 
costs part in the notes to the financial statements.
QUALITY: To measure the audit firm quality, we use granted 
privileges to the audit firm quality. The rates announced by the 
Iranian Society of Certified Public Accountants. We classify 
the four categories of high quality (1) to less quality (4).
BANKDEBT: The corporate bank debt that discloses in part 
of long-term debt of financial statement.
BOARDSIZE: The number of board members including 
executive and non-executive members.
DUALITY: Equal to 1 if the Director is a member of the 
board and zero otherwise.
INDEPENDENT: Number of non-executive members in 
board.
GOVERNMENT: Equal 1 if the government has a majority 
stake of firm.
MAIN: Equal to 1 if the company is main and zero if com-
pany is subsidiary.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure quality is the dependent vari-
able in this research. We use the scores for annual disclosure of 
listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for 2009 to 2013. 
These rates are calculated in terms of reliability and timeliness 
of information. In addition, topics such as forecasts of earnings 
per share, the mid-term financial statements were not audited, 
the auditor’s comments relative to forecast earnings per share 
in the first six months of the financial statements for the six-
month period, no audited financial statements and audited 
financial period and calculate the amount of delay in data trans-
mission, effect on this rates.
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4.5 Control Variables
SIZE: Firm size is one of the control variables in this study. 
Firm size calculates by logarithm of the total assets of compa-
nies. We believe that the larger companies disclose completely. 
LEVERAGE: Financial leverage is another control variable 
in this study. This variable calculated by dividing total debt to 
total equity firms. 
EV/EBIT: This variable is third control variable of the study. 
EV in the denominator is the company value (Equity Value) 
and EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxing.
4.6 Panel Data Econometric Model
In general the advantage of using panel data over time series 
and cross sectional data is that panel data provide more com-
bination of time series and cross sectional data, greater diver-
sity or volatility, less multicollinearity between variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Time series usually 
have multicollinearity while panel data at cross-sectional di-
mension of data will cause a lot of variability or diversity. By 
having such information more reliable estimates can be made. 
Furthermore, this model provides more opportunity for identi-
fying and measuring the effects that cannot be easily measured 
just by cross sectional data or time series. The following panel 
data model is reviewed to get more familiar with it.
Yit = 𝛼i + βit µit + uit
Where 𝛼
I
 is the intercept, βit is the vector of coefficients or 
parameters. 
Β = (β1 , β2 ,….., βk)
Where µit includes k explanatory variables, uit  is the model 
disturbing sentence which follows the assumptions of classical 
regression and t is the time period.
t = 1, 2, …, T  
In this case, the estimation of above equation depends on 
our sale about the intercept, the slope coefficient and the uit 
error sentence. Common methods to estimate the above equa-
tion using the panel data are:
1. Joint Effects Model 
2. Fixed Effects Model
3. Random Effects Model
4.7 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the research data are displayed in 
Table 1. Since the numbers assigned to the variables of cor-
porate governance are qualitative they do not have descriptive 
statistics because artificial variables do not accept descriptive 
statistics.
4.8 Determining an Appropriate Model for the 
Research
To assess this matter that which model should be used to 
test the hypotheses, the data first inter to R software. Then the 
software begins to test all following four methods:
1. Simple OLS model
2. OLS model with applying time factor
3. PLM model with fixed effects
4. PLM model with random effects
Then, the best estimation model select according to the 
Chow test, Hausman test, and Breusch-Hagan tests results and 
the identify results of the hypotheses tests. Given the four afore-
mentioned tests and identifying the results by the software, now 
Chow, Hausman, and Breusch-Hagan tests are administered to 
select the best model.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Disclosure 
quality
Tenure
Audit
firm age
Minimum 0 1 1
Maximum 99 89 29
Mean 59.65 6.31 11.75
Mode 25.59 1 9
SD 0 6.88 8
Audit Fees Firm Size
Financial 
leverage
EV/EBIT
Minimum 35 10.36 -89.44 -101.29
Maximum 3575 13.82 89.6 1662.4
Mean 517 11.64 1.77 129.61
Mode 300 11.88 1.5 -
SD 403 0.56 10.35 1089.6
4.9 Chow Test
Chow introduced a model that is used for selecting between 
ordinary least squares (OLS) of integrated data model and fixed 
effects model. The model hypotheses are:
H
0
 = µ1 = µ2 = … = µn-1 = 0  
H1 = otherwise
μ is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the fixed effects 
model. In this test, H
0
 indicates equal coefficients and inter-
cepts of the surveyed companies and thus the rejection of null 
hypothesis indicates the use of panel data and non-rejection of 
the null hypothesis indicates the use of integrated ordinary least 
squares. In other words, if the null hypothesis is confirmed the 
use of OLS is recommended and if the null hypothesis is re-
jected the use of panel data is recommended. 
Since there are two OLS models in estimation methods, 
Chow test is run for two levels: one between fixed effects 
model and simple OLS model, and the other between fixed 
effects model and panel model of fixed effects with applying 
time factor.
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Table 2 Chaw test between simple effects model and simple OLS
F statistic 10.9
Denominator
degree of freedom
260
Numerator degree 
of freedom
4 p-Value 0.001>
Since the null hypothesis is rejected panel model with fixed 
effects is preferred (P<0.001).
Table 3 Chow test between panel model of fixed effects with applying time 
factor and panel model of fixed effects
F statistic 1.06
Two degrees of 
freedom
332
One degree of 
freedom
9 p-value 0.03
Since the null hypothesis is rejected panel model with fixed 
effects is preferred (P = 0.03).
Now, the selection of random effects model or fixed effects 
model is examined through the Hausman test.
4.10 Hausman Test
Given that the Chow test has confirmed the panel data and 
fixed effects model now one of the two models of estimating 
panel data, i.e. fixed effects model or random effects model 
should be selected. For this purpose, Hausman test statistic is 
used in panel data. The model Hypotheses are:
H
0
: preference for the use of random effect model 
H1: acceptance of fixed effect model and rejection of random 
effect model 
Table 4 Hausman test
Chi-square statistic Degree of freedom p-value
3.08 9 0.961
Since the null hypothesis is not rejected panel model of ran-
dom effects is preferred to panel model of fixed effects to fit the 
data (P = 0.0961).
4.11 Breusch-Pagan Test
Breusch and Pagan in 1980 used the Lagrangian Multiplier 
(LM) to test integrated data model versus the mutual random 
effects. The likelihood is obtained using the maximum estimate 
model. The test hypotheses are:
H
0
 : δa
2 = 0
H1 : δa
2> 0
In these hypotheses, δa
2 shows the variance of sectional 
effect of estimated model through the random effect. The null 
hypothesis means that the use of integrated data model (OLS) 
is better and rejecting the null hypothesis means the variance 
anisotropy and the use of random effects in the model. 
The test is divided into 3 parts: Breusch-Pagan test by con-
sidering the effects of location, the effects of time, and the 
effects of time and location at the same time. The results of the 
tests are displayed in graphs 4-11 to 4-13.
Table 5 Breusch-Pagan test for the integration of location effects
Chi-square statistic Degree of freedom p-value
150.4 1 >0.001
Since the null hypothesis is rejected the effects of location in 
the panel model of random effects are not integrated (p<0.001). 
Table 6 Breusch-Pagan test for the integration of time effects
Chi-square statistic Degree of freedom p-value
22.43 1 >0.001
Since the null hypothesis is rejected the effects of time in 
the panel model of random effects are not integrated (p<0.001). 
Table 7 Breusch-Pagan test for the integration of time and location effects
Chi-square statistic Degree of freedom p-value
172.7 2 >0.001
Since the null hypothesis is rejected the effects of time and 
location in the panel model of random effects are not inte-
grated (p<0.001). Consequently, with regard to the rejection 
of all three hypotheses of Breusch-Pagan test, the PLM model 
or the random effects model should be used to estimate the 
research model. Now the assumptions of classical regression 
model should be investigated. If the assumptions are violated 
we should seek to resolve them.
4.12 Classical regression assumptions
4.12.1 Heteroscedasticity
One of the most important assumptions of classical linear 
regression model is that ei disturbing components that appear 
as the population regression function have similar variance. If 
there is variance anisotropy F and T-tests provide false results 
and then the hypotheses cannot be tested by F-test and t-test. 
There are several methods and tests for detecting variance ani-
sotropy including graphical approach, White test, Gelchser test, 
Goldfield-Quant test, Bartelt test, Spearman test, Peak test, Park 
test. In this study in order to study the homogeneity of variances 
Breusch-Pagan test and also Breusch-Godfrey test have been 
used. The hypotheses in both tests are tested as the following:
H0 = homogeneity of variance
H1 = variance anisotropy
If the p- value of the test is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis 
about the homogeneity of variance is rejected and there is the 
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problem of variance anisotropy. If there is variance anisotropy 
in the model, the generalized least square (GLS) model can be 
used to resolve it and to estimate the model.
Table 8 Breusch-Godfrey test
Chi-square statisticDegree of freedomp-value
172.72>0.001
As mentioned above, if the null hypothesis that there is 
consistency between the variances is rejected there won’t be 
homogenous variances. Now Breusch-Pagan test is reviewed:
Table 9 Breusch-Pagan test
BP statisticDegree of freedomp-value
16777>0.001
Since the null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is rejected, 
there won’t be homogeneity of variances in this model. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test also 
endorses this claim. 
4.12.2 Non-Autocorrelation
In a classical linear regression model it is assumed that the 
covariance between the disturbing components is equal to zero. 
In other words, there is no correlation between the disturbing 
components. This means that the disturbing component related 
to one observation is not influenced by the disturbing compo-
nent of another observation. Violation of this assumption cre-
ates a problem called autocorrelation. Although autocorrela-
tion arises in cross sectional data, it is more common in time 
series data. If there is autocorrelation, it creates problems such 
as inefficient estimates and unreal F and t statistics. In order 
to detect the presence of autocorrelation graphical approach, 
Durbin-Watson test, Hadri test or LM test can be used. Since 
the presence of autocorrelation in waste leads to incorrect esti-
mates of standard error and consequently incorrect statistical 
inferences there are several ways to ensure the lack of auto-
correlation among which Hadri test can be referred to. The 
null hypothesis of the research states that there is autocorrela-
tion between disturbing components. Therefore, according to 
the results of this test and failure to reject the null hypothesis 
and presence of autocorrelation, in order to fit an appropriate 
model for data, PGLM method or random effects should be 
used instead of PLM.
Table 10 Hadri test
Hadri p-value
Test 0.67
4.12.3 Fitting PGLM Panel Model with Random 
Effects 
Now, with regard to the selection of random effects model 
the results of running the model with random effects is pre-
sented in the Table. It should be noted that the effects of audit 
quality and internal and external corporate governance on the 
quality of information disclosure have been tested separately 
for more strength of the results.
Table 11 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (audit quality-disclosure quality)
DISCLOSURE = β
0
 + β1SPECIALITYi,t + β2PERIODi,t + β3 
EXPERIMENT i,t  + β4 QUALITY i,t + β5 FEE i,t  + β6 SIZE i,t + β7 
LEVERAGE i,t + β8 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Intercept (model 
constant)
3.33 45.22 0.07 0.94
Audit firm size 0.38 5.86 -1.48 0.06
Auditor industry 
specialization
-2.42 3.54 -0.68 0.49
Auditor tenure -0.02 0.20 -0.11 0.90
Audit firm age 0.29 0.21 1.39 0.16
Audit firm quality 
(grade 2 to 1)
-1.58 4.42 -0.35 0.72
Audit firm quality 
(grade 3 to 1)
11.05 15.59 0.70 0.47
Audit fees -393.5 393.02 -1.001 0.31
Audit committee 7.53 0.19 0.3 0.059
Company size 4.81 3.92 1.22 0.21
Financial leverage -0.16 0.12 -1.32 0.018
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.77 0.07
According to the Table 11 and non-significant model and 
variables of the research the main variables are being elimi-
nated respectively from the largest amount that has no effect on 
the model until the non-significant level of the model decreases 
and the model becomes significant. The results of the model are 
presented in the following table.
By eliminating the model intercept, the Table 12 is obtained.
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Table 12 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (after elimination of intercept)
DISCLOSURE = β
0
SPECIALITYi,t + β1PERIODi,t + β2 EXPERIMENT i,t  
+ β
3
 QUALITY i,t + β
4
 FEE i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t + β6 LEVERAGE i,t + β7 EV/
EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 1.83 3.64 0.79 0.31
Auditor industry 
specialization
0.91 45.22 0.07 0.98
Auditor tenure -0.02 46.42 0.01 0.98
Audit firm age 0.29 0.20 -0.11 0.16
Audit firm quality 
(grade 2 to 1)
-1.58 0.21 1.39 0.72
Audit firm quality 
(grade 3 to 1)
11.05 4.42 -0.35 0.47
Audit fees -393.5 15.59 0.70 0.31
Audit committee 4.51 3.6 -2.27 0.067
Company size 4.81 393.02 -0.001 0.21
Financial leverage -0.16 3.92 -1.32 0.018
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.012 -1.77 0.07
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of auditor 
industry specialization is eliminated. The result is displayed in 
the Table 13.
Table 13 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model with
random effects (after elimination of auditor industry specialization)
DISCLOSURE = β1PERIODi,t + β2 EXPERIMENT i,t  + β3 QUALITY i,t + 
β
4
 FEE i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t + β6 LEVERAGE i,t + β7 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 0.25 4.6 0.36 0.08
Auditor tenure -0.03 46.42 -0.13 0.88
Audit firm age 0.27 0.21 1.32 0.18
Audit firm quality 
(grade 2 to 1)
11.23 4.42 0.26 0.79
Audit firm quality 
(grade 3 to 1)
24.14 15.59 0.53 0.59
Audit fees -392.01 393.02 -0.99 0.31
Audit committee 4.72 1.35 -0.54 0.071
Company size 3.7 3.92 1.06 0.28
Financial leverage 0.12 0.13 -1.28 0.019
EV/EBIT 0.00 0.001 -1.74 0.08
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of auditor ten-
ure is eliminated. The result is displayed in the Table 14.
Table 14 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model with
random effects (after elimination of auditor tenure)
DISCLOSURE = β1 EXPERIMENT i,t  + β2 QUALITY i,t + β3 FEE i,t  + β4 
SIZE i,t + β5 LEVERAGE i,t + β6 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 0.53 1.15 0.86 0.079
Audit firm age 0.24 0.20 1.22 0.22
Audit firm quality 
(grade 2 to 1)
10.95 42.79 0.25 0.79
Audit firm quality 
(grade 3 to 1)
23.80 44.95 0.52 0.59
Audit fees -399.6 393.15 -1.01 0.30
Audit committee 3.83 0.79 0.73 0.062
Company size 3.95 3.69 1.06 0.28
Financial leverage -0.002 0.001 -1.26 0.020
EV/EBIT 0.00 0.00 -1.73 0.08
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of audit firm 
quality is eliminated. The result is displayed in the Table 15.
Table 15 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model with
random effects (after elimination of audit firm quality)
DISCLOSURE = β1 EXPERIMENT i,t  + + β2 FEE i,t  + β3 SIZE i,t + β4 
LEVERAGE i,t + β5 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 0.93 2.71 -2.33 0.069
Audit firm age 0.24 0.19 1.25 0.21
Audit fees -0.95 0.91 -1.02 0.30
Audit committee 5.67 0.25 -1.5 0.059
Company size 5.02 0.29 17.5 <0.001
Financial leverage -0.15 0.12 -1.26 0.020
EV/EBIT 0.00 0.00 -1.77 0.07
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of audit firm 
age and experience is eliminated. The result is displayed in the 
Table 16.
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Table 16 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (after elimination of audit firm age)
DISCLOSURE = β1 FEE i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t + β3 LEVERAGE i,t + β4 EV/
EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 0.58 1.53 2.26 0.084
Audit fees 0.24 0.19 1.24 0.21
Audit committee 3.26 0.57 -0.27 0.076
Company size 4.94 0.27 17.7 <0.001
Financial leverage -0.15 0.12 -1.29 0.019
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.87 0.06
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of audit fees is 
eliminated. The result is displayed in the Table 17.
Table 17 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (after elimination of audit fees)
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit firm size 1.27 3.4 3.95 0.094
Audit committee 4.97 0.67 0.64 0.082
Company size 5.18 0.20 25.89 <0.001
Financial leverage -0.14 0.12 -1.21 0.022
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.83 0.06
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of audit firm 
size is eliminated. The result is displayed in the Table 18.
Table 18 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (after elimination of audit firm size)
DISCLOSURE = β1 SIZE i,t + β2 LEVERAGE i,t + β3 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Audit committee 4.28 0.29 -0.89 0.079
Company size 5.18 0.20 25.89 <0.001
Financial leverage -0.14 0.12 -1.21 0.022
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.83 0.06
Since the model is insignificant, the variable of audit com-
mittee is eliminated. The result is displayed in the Table 19.
Table 19 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (after elimination of audit committee)
DISCLOSURE = β1 SIZE i,t + β2 LEVERAGE i,t + β3 EV/EBITi,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Company size 5.18 0.20 25.89 <0.001
Financial leverage -0.14 0.12 -1.21 0.022
EV/EBIT -0.002 0.001 -1.83 0.06
Here the model gets significant since there are only control 
variables. Therefore, with regard to rejecting all main variables 
of independent audit quality, contrary to the society imagina-
tion, it is concluded that there is no significant positive or nega-
tive relationship between independent audit quality and the 
quality of information disclosure of financial statements.
Now, the results of running the corporate governance model 
and its effect on the quality of information disclosure are pre-
sented in Table 20.
Table 20 The results of estimation of the coefficients of PGLM model
with random effects (corporate governance-disclosure quality)
DISCLOSURE = β
0
 + β1BANKDEBTi,t + β2BOARDSIZEi,t + β3 DUALITY 
i,t + β4 INDEPENDENT i,t  + β5 GOVERNMENT i,t + β6 MAIN i,t + εi
Variable coefficient
Standard 
deviation
t statistic p-value
Intercept (model 
constant)
4.15 19.14 1.53 0.011
Bank debt 5.965 2.4 0.56 0.029
Board of directors 
Size
0.34 0.08 0.96 0.003
CEO membership in 
board of directors
9.6 0.10 0.32 0.008
board of directors 
Independency
0.67 1.5 1.66 0.01
government 
ownership and 
influence in company
8.5 2.11 1.3 0.009
main or subsidiary 
company
0.24 0.31 0.82 0.6
Adoption of corporate 
governance rules
0.36 1.16 0.93 0.004
As it is observed in the table, in spite of the quality of inde-
pendent audit quality, all assumptions of the corporate govern-
ance (except main or subsidiary company) are accepted. The 
coefficients show that the all of the relationships are straight and 
positive. Therefore there are a positive relationship between all 
of the corporate governance variables and information disclo-
sure quality. The results of hypotheses testing are analyzed in 
the conclusion.
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5 Conclusion
According the results of the study, it can conclude that audit 
firm size has no effect on the increase of quality of information 
disclosure of financial statements. This is due to the fact that 
large audit firms with regard to the high volume of work and 
audit contracts pay less attention to the quality of performed 
work and focus more on the quantity of conducted work. As 
a result, the audit client gets more chance to conceal the facts 
contained in the financial statements and consequently the qual-
ity of information disclosure will lower. Further, the results also 
showed that there is no significant relationship between auditor 
industry specialization and quality of information disclosure of 
financial statements. The researchers’ assumption has originated 
from the point that DeBoskey et al. (2012) states that the audi-
tor industry specialization is the creation of new ideas to help 
the audit clients and generation of added value for them as well 
as provision of new perspectives and solutions for some of the 
problems that the audit clients are faced with in their respective 
industries. Industry expertise audit firms with their knowledge 
and cognition of certain issues and complexities of an industry 
have more remarkable monitoring and informative role than the 
other audit firms in that industry and can provide reliable infor-
mation for the investors and thus reduce the market information 
risk. Namazi et al. (2011) stated that independent auditor indus-
try specialization will reduce the earnings management by cre-
ating a barrier to the unreal preparation of financial statements. 
They also reported that auditor industry specialization is a deter-
rent and an incentive for disclosure of true information. Badavar 
Nahandi and Taghizadeh Khaneghah (2013) stated that audi-
tor industry specialization by influencing audit quality would 
reduce information asymmetry and the agency problems created 
via the gap between management and investors. These points 
lead us to the conclusion that the enhancement of audit quality 
due to auditor industry specialization can improve the quality of 
information disclosure of financial statements which ultimately 
leads to the decrease of information asymmetry. However, with 
regard to rejecting the research hypothesis, it is concluded that 
there is no significant relationship between auditor industry 
specialization and quality of information disclosure of financial 
statements. It can conclude that auditor industry specialization 
does not decrease or increase the quality of information disclo-
sure of financial statements of the companies. Since most of the 
audit firms in this research were industry specialists this matter 
could result from the fact that auditing companies by industry 
expert auditors cannot be in such a way to affect the quality 
of information disclosure of financial statements of companies. 
Thus, the investors cannot ensure the quality of information dis-
closure of financial statements just by relying on expert auditors.
Furthermore the results also revealed that that there is no 
significant relationship between auditor tenure and quality of 
information disclosure of financial statements. Kamran (2008) 
believes that high complexity of companies’ workplace has 
caused the auditor not to be able to get completely familiar with 
the activities of audited company within a short period of time. 
Auditor selection continuity makes the auditor get more spe-
cial knowledge gradually which leads to the enhancement of 
auditor professional competence and audit quality. However, it 
found that audit quality enhancement due to the auditor tenure 
has no effect on the quality of information disclosure of finan-
cial statements. Perhaps this is due to the factors mentioned by 
Sajadi et al. (2012). They state that auditor selection continuity 
destroys his independence. However, according to the studies 
conducted by Mashayekhi et al. (2013), Myers et al. (2003), 
Badavar Nahandi and Taghizadeh Khaneghah (2013) auditor 
tenure with regard to its effect on audit quality will lead to bet-
ter auditing of financial statements. Accordingly, our assump-
tion was about the effect of auditor tenure on the quality of 
information disclosure of financial statements.
Moreover it can conclude that there is no significant rela-
tionship between the quality of audit firm and quality of infor-
mation disclosure of financial statements. Auditing Standards 
Board (2011) states that audit quality enhancement due to audit 
firm quality will raise optimism and public positive outlook on 
financial statements of the companies. Therefore, the share-
holders look at the financial statements published by the com-
pany as the ones with full disclosure. Craswell et al. (2002) 
stated that quality audit firms will do quality auditing in order 
to keep their fame and reputation. Consequently, good quality 
of an audit firm does not guarantee the disclosure quality of the 
audit client company and there is no relationship between the 
quality of audit firms and the quality of information disclosure 
of financial statements. Thus, the shareholders cannot ensure 
the quality of information disclosure of the company solely by 
relying on the quality of audit firms.
Furthermore, the results showed that there is no signifi-
cant relationship between the age and experience of audit firm 
and quality of information disclosure of financial statements. 
Khajavi and Noshadi (2009) stated that in order to prevent the 
lawsuits and public attitudes towards them, the auditors try to 
conduct auditing very carefully and with high quality. Dolan 
(2015) mentioned that auditors experience in auditing would 
increase audit quality and would lead to more careful examina-
tion by the auditors. Consequently, this matter can affect the 
disclosure information of financial statements. However, in this 
research it concluded that the age and experience of audit firm 
has no significant effect on the quality of information disclo-
sure of financial statements. Therefore, the auditors experience 
has no effect on the increase or decrease of the quality of infor-
mation disclosure of financial statements of the companies. As 
a result, shareholders cannot ensure the quality of information 
disclosure of financial statements simply by assigning the com-
pany auditing to an experienced audit firm or organization.
It can be also conclude that there is no significant rela-
tionship between the audit fees and quality of information 
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disclosure of financial statements. Eshleman and Gou (2013) 
concluded that audit fees will increase audit quality and the 
auditor who receives high fees tries to provide the high-
est quality of the audit work for the audit client. Darougheh 
Hazrati and Pahlavan (2012) emphasized that audit fees would 
improve the audit quality and would lead to better investi-
gation of financial statements by the auditors. Therefore, it 
assumed that the audit quality enhancement due to audit fees 
would increase the quality of information disclosure of finan-
cial statements. It can be due to the fact that long duration of 
auditing or the number of auditors who are employed to do 
auditing for the audit client will increase audit costs and has no 
effect on the quality of disclosed information. Thus, assigning 
auditing to the audit firms with high fees or long investiga-
tion that increase the audit costs cannot influence the quality 
of information disclosure of financial statements. Moutinho 
et al. (2013) concluded that there is a significant relationship 
between them. Yet, despite their opinion, it was concluded in 
this research that there is no significant relationship between 
audit fees and the quality of information disclosure.
It can also conclude that presence or absence of audit com-
mittee in companies has no effect on the quality of information 
disclosure of financial statements. This is probably due to inef-
ficiency or inadequate effectiveness of audit committee in com-
panies. One of the objectives of the formation of audit commit-
tees according to the laws is providing adequate and necessary 
information for the users and revealing the facts which should 
ultimately lead to the increase of quality of information dis-
closure of financial statements. However, it concluded that the 
audit committees have no effect on the quality of information 
disclosure of financial statements.
The results showed that that there is a significant relation-
ship between the bank debt and the information disclosure of 
financial statements. This means that companies are more will-
ing to disclose their liabilities to the banks including interest 
and long term loans because these debts result from govern-
ment and state rules and regulations and are out of the control 
of the companies which is quite logical.
Therefore, the number of the members of the board is an 
effective factor in disclosure of financial information.
The results revealed that that there is a significant relation-
ship between the CEO membership in the board of directors 
and the information disclosure of financial statements. This is 
because of the fact that when the CEO is the member of the 
board the possibility of information disclosure decreases since 
the board of directors is in charge of confirming financial state-
ments and the CEO membership in the board of directors can 
lead to the ignorance of major issues in financial statements. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that when the concentration of 
management decisions and control decisions is appointed to 
one person, it hinders the effectiveness of the board of direc-
tors to monitor the senior management and thus concealment 
in disclosing information will increase. Like Fama and Jensen 
(1983) opinion, it concluded in this research the lack of mem-
bership of the CEO in the board of directors will increase the 
disclosure of information.
The results also showed that there is a significant relation-
ship between the board of directors’ independence (the ratio of 
bound to outside members) and the information disclosure of 
financial statements. This means that when the number of out-
side members of the board of directors is more, the company is 
less willing to disclose financial statements information. This 
is sometimes due to the fact that outside members that are legal 
representatives of other companies are willing to create more 
earnings for their own allies through less disclosure. Bhojraj et 
al. (2003) concluded that the board of directors would lead to 
the decrease of agency problems and consequently preparation 
of better financial statements (better disclosure) which was also 
approved of in this research.
It can be conclude that if the companies are influenced by 
the government, with regard to the pressure from the govern-
ment, they are more willing to disclose their information. Since 
they are under the direct authority of the state or state-owned 
companies, such companies must report their information 
clearly to them.
The results also showed that there is no significant relation-
ship between the main or subsidiary companies and quality 
of information disclosure of financial statements. This results 
from the fact that in order to report the preparation of integrated 
financial statements to the main companies, subsidiary compa-
nies have to disclose the financial statements information com-
pletely. The subsidiary companies controlled and under pres-
sure by the main companies and cannot disclose their financial 
statements as they like themselves. As a result, being the main 
or subsidiary company will affect the information disclosure of 
financial statements.
According to the finding, it can conclude that adoption of 
corporate governance rules will affect the information disclo-
sure of financial statements. Strong internal and external corpo-
rate governance within the structure of a company can enhance 
internal controls and increase the quality of disclosure and also 
decrease the fact concealment.
Finally, it can conclude that despite public perception, there 
is no significant positive relationship between independent 
audit quality and the quality of information disclosure of finan-
cial statements. On the contrary, there is a significant positive 
relationship between internal and external corporate governance 
and the quality of information disclosure of financial statements.
5.1 Research Limitations
As mentioned above, generally the research in which audit fees 
play the role of a variable is faced with the limitation of disclosure 
of the cost in financial statements. In this research due to the pres-
ence of audit fees variable, the studied sample was reduced.
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Since the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange are taking 
the initial steps to implement corporate governance in compa-
nies, studying corporate governance in such companies was 
difficult and lack of access to the required information of cor-
porate governance of the companies is one of the limitations of 
the research.
With regard to very high inflation in Iran and the use of his-
torical cost method by companies to disclose the value of assets 
and liabilities in financial statements, the data are less relevant 
but more reliable. Lack of use of current values by companies 
in Iran is another limitation of the research.
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